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Abstract 
Privatization was a centerpiece of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition process, 
the main drivers of which were the desire to increase the role of private business, the need for 
economic restructuring and increasing of efficiency and ambitions to crush the economic might 
of the communist regime and establish the basis of a new political elite. Until the mid-2000s the 
main transition goals of CEE economies were largely achieved, which is also expressed in their 
EU-accession. However, the transition process did not create economic systems fully 
comparable with more established market economies of the EU. After successful stabilization 
and large scale de-nationalization of state property the first two drivers of privatization lost 
importance. Furthermore external pressure from international organizations such as the World 
Bank or the European Commission declined. After becoming members of the “club” only the 
third driver remained intact and CEE governments started to rethink their relationship towards 
state property using it as an “uncontrolled tap of public money”. Weak civil and political control 
institutions enabled these processes. This development is illustrated by the examples of 
Hungary and Poland. This paper aims at contributing to the development of the theory of CEE 
capitalism models with the analysis of the changing role of state ownership and privatization. 
 
JEL: D72, H82, P16, P31 
Keywords: Central and Eastern Europe, privatization, crony capitalism, rent seeking 
 
                                                 
1 The study was prepared for the OTKA project No. 112069 “Varieties of Capitalism – Varieties of Direct 
Economic Intervention of the State”. First draft, please do not quote! Comments are welcome: 
szanyi.miklos@krtk.mta.hu.  
2 Professor of economics, Budapest Business School; research director, Institute of World Economics, 
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
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Introduction 
The topic of privatization in (post)transition economies has lost attention after the 
millennium. The last major privatization deals were conducted by then in the Czech 
Republic and Romania among others representing late-comer economies in this regard. 
Moreover, most transition economies of CEE became members of the European Union 
(EU) in 2004 and 2007. This was an event that put a kind of seal on the history of 
transition in the countries of the region. As members of the club new rules were applied 
in the monitoring and evaluation of the conditions and development of these economies 
and the policies of their governments. New areas of interest like convergence, 
application of common EU regulations and macroeconomic policies overshadowed many 
of the key areas of the transition process. Soon afterwards a new topic and threat, the 
world economic depression has captured much of the attention. The serious imbalances 
of the financial sectors as well as new problems of fiscal policies and the Euro zone 
captured the minds of analysts and policy-makers. New EU members were also 
monitored primarily for their fiscal policies.  
Somewhat unexpectedly, the topic of privatization and state property management 
also gained some fresh interest in the realm of the crisis. On the one hand, massive bail-
out programs especially in the financial sector increased the volume of state property in 
many developed countries. On the other hand, some crisis-ridden economies like Greece 
started to think about selling state properties in order to ease their debt burden and 
fiscal stabilization. State property management policies underwent important changes 
also in some of the CEE countries. The changes were sometimes explained with the 
impact of the crisis. However, they were usually not meant as temporary measures. This 
is a shift from the previously enforced institution building process with strong emphasis 
on the role of market conform institutions and strengthening competition towards more 
direct state control of the economy. This shift was backed by neo-Keynesian thoughts 
and the crisis of neo-liberal policies. Yet, we believe that in the case of post-transition 
economies of Central Europe these processes as well as ambitions of maintaining or 
even increasing the scope of state property are the reflection of an important systemic 
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element of the region: the return of the tradition of strong state intervention, 
paternalism and cozy links between polity and business3. 
 
1. Principles of public property management and privatization 
The analysis of the topic of keeping or selling state property should start with the 
most basic question: why should the state, a bureaucratic institution manage assets that 
can also be run by the private sector? Modern history of developed countries was bound 
to the establishment of democracies and the increasing role of markets. Political 
activities were institutionally separated from the business. The private wealth of those 
who were involved in making politics was not controlled directly or influenced by the 
matters of political institutions and the state in any way. However, the classic model of 
free market economy is proved to be inefficient in providing some services that used to 
be run previously by private landlords or monarchs. The first such cases were public 
utilities, first of all roads. Railway construction showed various patterns in different 
countries. Private railways dominated many of the more developed countries, while in 
less developed ones it was often the state who initiated and financed railway 
construction. In many cases state ownership was created through nationalization of the 
railways. In the provision of public utilities like water and drainage, electricity and gas 
supply or in street lighting supplies similar patterns could be observed. Public 
ownership in these cases developed mainly because the public interest required the 
steady, reliable and possibly cheap solutions for the services. 
But efficient and cheap public services were also politically important issues. Efficient 
transport networks were crucial for increasing mobility in the era of the first industrial 
revolutions. The creation of adequate infrastructure for economic development was 
considered as primary interest of the state as such, this ambition can also be regarded as 
the first appearance of developmental state. State ambitions of establishing new high 
technology industries appeared on the scene almost simultaneously in the peripheries. 
                                                 
3 The idea of sketching some of the systemic elements of a Central European model of capitalism was 
described in Szanyi (2012). I believe that the now topical dependent market economy (DME) model (see: 
Nölke – Vliegenhart, 2009) must be amended, hence FDI-dependence is just half of the story. We should 
also understand the reasons for weak local business development and the ambiguous role of the state 
and polity in general in the economy.  
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The example of the Austro-Hungarian Empire is a good model how the developmental 
state functioned in the late 19th century. The state played significant role in the 
establishment of the railway network, and organizing railway services and also 
supported high tech industries like iron and steel, railway machinery construction and 
maintenance. In more indirect ways mainly through public procurement ship building, 
aviation and the supply of military equipment were promoted as well. Later (mainly 
after 1920) many of these industries were nationalized. The state is proved to play an 
important direct economic role in shaping economic structure and increasing 
technological sophistication of production. Thus, a second motivation of establishing 
state control in the economy (mainly in industry) was the ambition of the developmental 
state. 
Many countries can be characterized by the first two considerations of running state-
owned assets in special spheres of the economy (albeit the scale and scope of state 
ownership may be very different by country and time period). But there is a third 
systemic reason of nationalization and running state property: the establishment of a 
planned economy. As it is well known, the Marxist analysis of the (nineteenth century 
version of) capitalism highlighted important inefficiencies especially potential losses, 
economic and social damages during crisis periods. These problems could be avoided if 
the spontaneous laws of the market coordination are replaced by scientifically planned 
bureaucratic coordination mechanisms. If scientific knowledge and planning (data 
processing) capacities allow it, main economic trends and activities can be predicted and 
economic action like production, distribution, interactions among economic agents and 
with consumers are commanded by central planning authorities. The command 
economy of the Soviet Union in the 1930s could have achieved significant results in the 
process of industrialization and modernization of the country. The theoretic criticism of 
that time (Schumpeter, Hayek and others) queried the existence of sufficiently large, 
sophisticated and efficient bureaucratic capacity that could have regulated such a 
complex system like the Soviet economy. Another strong argument criticized the rigidity 
of the system: structural changes and technological development were regarded as 
noises in the system that should be confined rather than encouraged. Central planning 
required the existence of an economy that carried out commands in disciplined ways. 
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Managers of economic units were regarded as executive officers who fulfilled commands 
given by authorities of the state (and also the politically commanding communist party). 
Hence, economic agents had to be the property of the state. 
It is quite obvious that this later type of state ownership differs conceptually from the 
two previously mentioned ones, even if the former considerations may also play a role in 
the command economy too. Thus, the reasons of establishing and maintaining state 
property may substantially differ between established market economies and transition 
countries. Hence, the question of keeping or selling state property must be formulated 
also rather differently. Arguments of maintaining public services in more developed 
market economies can only be applied in transition economies with restrictions4. On the 
other hand, systemic change of transition economies was very strongly bound to selling 
state property: privatization became an important political question. 
 
1.1.  State property in the neoliberal policy mix 
Changes in the status of public (state) property come mostly together with major 
changes of the philosophy of economic policy making. This concerns especially the 
magnitude and intensity of the various forms of direct state interventions in the 
economy. While the overwhelming activity of state bureaucracy in central planning was 
regarded rather univocally very skeptical by non-Marxist economists, a more limited 
albeit rather substantial involvement was regarded as useful by many. Keynesian and 
neo-Keynesian scholars for example did not obey the usage of state controlled 
companies for the stimulation of markets. The smoothing of cyclical fluctuations and 
prevention of strong negative effects like unemployment was affected by direct state 
intervention in many countries during the golden age of the 1960s and 70s. Also, in 
many West European countries state-owned enterprises (SOEs) played important role 
in the provision of some welfare services. SOEs became major contributors of the 
achievements of European welfare models. 
                                                 
4 The privatization boom in Britain, France and some other countries preceded the transition process in 
CEE. Based on the neoliberal concept state involvement was reduced. State ownership was regarded as 
inferior to private ownership even in cases where state ownership was the result of a market failure. The 
old tradition of the developmental state was also regarded as obsolete. However, these privatization 
deals brought mixed results. In some cases quality of activities did not improve in private ownership 
either (see: Török, 2014). 
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The early critics (like Joseph Schumpeter) of the Keynesian economic policy 
highlighted the fact, that demand stimulation through public spending may only be 
useful if it is used in an anti-cyclical manner, and if it targets investments that pay off 
over time. Otherwise, the Keynesian model is nothing else than a “theory of spending”. In 
fact, the timing and the quality of public spending deserved criticism during the 1960s 
and 70s in many countries, but also in many of the post-transition economies during the 
late 2000s. The multiplier effect of public spending was not strong and continuous in 
many cases and resulted in increased public debt. Much of the debt was accumulated by 
inefficient public companies, SOEs. Long years of recession and stagflation in the US and 
Europe during the late 1970s and 1980s moved the pendulum of economic thought into 
the opposite direction. Failure of Keynesian policies including the role of SOEs led to a 
general rejection of direct state intervention in the economy.  
Without going into the analysis of the neoliberal revolution and its impact on 
economic policy we may state that there were two main conclusions for state property 
management. First, state ownership was regarded as superficial and inefficient, because 
decision making in SOEs was strongly influenced by political considerations that 
overwrite business rationale. Second, firms operate in many cases on regulated markets. 
Another source of distortion for business rationale might come from superficial market 
regulation that weakens competition and also increases transaction costs deteriorating 
efficiency of business units. Thus, the neoliberal solution for the problems in the real 
economy was based on two main pillars: deregulation and privatization. 
A number of countries in continental Europe did not follow the British policy pattern 
till its extremes. Governments in Italy, France and Germany intended to maintain as 
much of the “achievements” of the welfare state and its institutions (including also SOEs) 
as it was possible. Fiscal discipline was strengthened, however not by the elimination of 
established social institutions of welfare capitalism. Rather a kind of change, a reform in 
running the institutions was conducted, being based on social consensus. This cautious 
shift in economic policy was influenced by the very intense social upheavals experienced 
by Britain during the mid 1980s that governments wanted to avoid, and also by the 
stronger labor unions and traditions of corporatism in continental Europe. Some 
countries efficiently reformed, others failed. 
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Concerning SOEs the picture is rather impressive. Today’s state ownership in 
business units seems to be not less efficient than pure private control. Firms with state 
ownership do not differ from other listed companies. Most important SOEs are joint 
stock companies with mixed ownership and meet the usual governance patterns of 
listed companies. Since corporate governance regulations in developed market 
economies perform sophisticated toolkits for specific problems of effective management 
control and minority shareholder protection, the state as an owner is usually not in a 
position to enforce any kind of political ambition. Hence, the old argument of 
overshadowed business rationale falls in the typical SOE of continental Europe. 
Therefore, the main argument of privatization does not seem to be valid5 any more. State 
ownership does not limit the efficient work of companies if they have mixed ownership 
pattern and are under efficient control of corporate governance institutions (most 
importantly the stock exchange). Nevertheless, in the time of transition in CEE the 
neoliberal economic thought still had a determining role in economic thinking and 
political practice of governments and international institutions. 
 
1.2.  Privatization in the transition policy mix 
Post-soviet and Central-European economies started the process of political and 
economic transition with a rather problematic heritage of the previous system. 
Transition meant changes on mass scale in all the political, social and economic spheres. 
Completely new institutional system had to be created. Political and economic routines 
that were previously based on cringe and state paternalism were to be changed and 
private initiatives were to take the initiative. The situation in the post-soviet sphere was 
especially tough since the required new routines were completely absent. After 80 years 
of communism nobody had firsthand experience with market economic and democratic 
policy routines. CEE also needed external support. During the 1990s many international 
institutions provided conceptual and financial support in shaping the transition process 
of CEE. The role of the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the various organizations of the European Union played 
                                                 
5 The current crisis did not show fundamentally different patterns of state involvement in public and 
private businesses either. Many private banks were bailed out, and some major SOEs mainly in the 
automotive sector were also supported by government policies.   
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especially important role. The actual design of policies was built largely on the 
perceptions of foreign experts. As it turned out, CEE economies’ actual conditions 
provided much surprise for foreign (sometimes also for domestic) observers and 
consultants (Roland, 2000). 
Since conditions of the transition were established by developed Western market 
economies, the transition process was also commanded by their political and economic 
principles summarized in the Washington Consensus. As it is known, this set of 
economic policy measures was originally designed for the reconstruction of some 
seriously indebted developing countries during the 1980s. The suggested therapy 
included the quick and efficient introduction (strengthening) of market economic 
institutions, quick and deep liberalization (especially foreign economic relations), strong 
stabilization efforts (deep cuts in public spending), privatization and the general 
withdrawal of the state from direct economic activities. The mix was called SLIP, an 
acronym for stabilization, liberalization, institution building and privatization. The aim 
of these policies was to create a level play field for independent economic players, to 
enhance the beneficial impacts of free competition as it was described by the neoliberal 
mainstream of the 1970s and 1980s. Critics of the mix stressed especially the fact that 
the conditions of the level play field favored the strongest and most influential 
multinational companies. Washington Consensus was eased later, and specific 
conditions of transition economies were paid more attention although the main message 
of the policy mix has not been changed yet. 
Though the expectations of international organizations and business were largely 
identical concerning the individual countries of CEE6, but the actual implementation, i.e. 
design, sequencing and speed of various measures varied greatly among them. The main 
differences were caused, first of all, by the current status of their economies, most 
importantly the levels of foreign and fiscal deficits. In countries like Poland and Hungary 
debt problems urged handling with stabilization policies. This is true even if all 
transition economies underwent rather deep transitional crises that boosted twin 
deficits. Foreign observers were surprised by the fact that transition economies’ 
enterprises could not modernize their production patterns overnight and were not able 
                                                 
6 This is reflected for example in their regular comparison e.g. in EBRD’s transition index. 
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to replace falling Eastern (post COMECON) sales quickly via contesting available 
Western markets (Roland, 2000). Consequently, stabilization measures played an 
important role in all CEE countries, but in Poland and in Hungary also other policies 
were influenced by the needs of cutting state debt rather quickly. In Hungary 
privatization policies were designed to deliver highest possible revenues. In Poland the 
bargaining for debt write-offs limited the chances of FDI attraction due to increased 
country risks. 
Another strong determinant of the actual layout of transition policies were the social 
and political conditions of the countries. The outstanding role of the Solidarity 
movement in Poland’s transition strongly influenced many policy steps there. As it will 
be elaborated in more detail later, privatization policy was always based on political and 
social consensus that also included the strong Solidarity union movement. In the Baltic 
states, the newly gained independence from Russia allowed the governments to impose 
strict stabilization measures, as they were considered as a condition of maintaining 
independence (Bohle and Greskovits 2007). As a result, steps of SLIP policies greatly 
varied among CEE transition economies concerning their design, timing and speed. 
Differences of the transition process have resulted in longer term consequences 
(differences) in many areas of the CEE economies that are effective even today. On the 
other hand, in many aspects there is convergence among them despite of large 
differences in policies. This can be applied – among others – to the process of 
privatization. State ownership was reduced to marginal level in all CEE regardless of the 
timing and methods of privatization. Another important and partly related similarity is 
the structural convergence of CEE economies, and the similarly high level of 
multinational companies’ presence. These similarities evolved due to imperatives of 
current world economic development patterns rather than the intentions of policy 
makers and advisers. Thus, trends of globalization may affect countries of similar 
development level and economic potential in the same ways in case they do not want to 
isolate themselves from the process of globalization. 
The primary neoliberal logic of privatization is the overall decline of state 
intervention in the economy. Especially direct state involvement was regarded as 
avoidable. Privatization was treated as the prime source of strengthening private 
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businesses. State property was to be distributed among private stakeholders, thus 
creating a strong capital owner and entrepreneur strata in the CEE societies that also 
was expected to support the new post-communist political elite. This consideration was 
the most important determinant of the design of the Czechoslovak voucher privatization 
scheme. Privatization supported many of the newly established market economic 
institutions. For example, virtually all CEE countries introduced privatization methods 
that included the newly established stock exchanges. Initial public offerings (IPO) of 
SOEs were among the first corporate shares that were traded. Here again we can see 
high expectations that became only partially effectual. It seems that only the Warsaw 
stock exchange took momentum after the years of transition and became sizeable 
enough (Ozsvald, 2014). All other stock exchanges stopped growing, no important new 
IPOs were launched, and moreover, the once introduced securities of former SOEs were 
largely withdrawn. By mentioning these examples, my only intention is to highlight the 
rather ambivalent relationship between privatization and the other elements of SLIP. 
 
2. The practice of privatization in CEE 
Privatization was one of the main elements of the neoliberal policy prescription 
provided by the main economic advisers of CEE countries. In this logic direct state 
ownership was inferior to private in terms of business efficiency and was reduced. In the 
introductory part of this paper we already called attention to the fact that public 
property when used under the control of capital markets does not necessarily perform 
worse than private. Therefore not public property in general, but the uncontrolled 
functioning of it can be regarded as potentially inefficient. Given the fact that transition 
economies have not possess effective capital markets (with the exception of Poland), 
SOEs still risk substandard performance and also potential influence of polity on their 
activities. Hence, the main argument for privatization expressed by foreign advisers still 
holds in CEE. 
Not only foreign advisers stressed the importance of privatization in CEE. There were 
numerous practical reasons for giving away SOEs. Pre-transition SOE’s activity was 
organized according to the logic of the command economy with no respect for market 
- 11 - 
Miklós Szanyi / Privatization and state property management  in 
post-transition economies 
 
economic principles that were to be abolished completely. This statement can be applied 
both for the functional logic of the firms and their practical activities (investments, 
product and technology development, labor relations, etc.). Consequently, the typical 
SOE possessed outdated products (selling only at large discounts on Western markets if 
at all), old fashioned technologies, limited engineering capacities specialized on 
redesigning already existing technical solutions. They did not possess managerial 
knowledge applicable in strong competition (liberalization was fulfilled almost 
overnight), no marketing skills (it was not required before), no capital for investments in 
new technologies, products and markets (firms had no right to withhold and accumulate 
reserves from their sales revenue). 
Not all of these problems were foreseen or correctly perceived at the beginning of the 
transition process. Transformational recession occurred because of huge drops in sales 
revenue of SOEs at the beginning of the 1990s (Kornai, 1994). Privatization was seen as 
a major tool of making firms more efficient and competitive. The simple dogma about 
the superiority of private ownership over public ownership was readily accepted by 
many observers and advisers. Yet, if we understand the complex task of restructuring, it 
becomes obvious that this would not succeed overnight either. A questionnaire survey 
of the time proved that the time span of successful restructuring depended on the 
endowments and possibilities of the owners (Szanyi, 1996). Larger firms with better 
sales potentials and especially foreign investors who possessed the necessary capital, 
technology and know-how as well as market access could redesign former SOEs quicker 
than domestic owners. But also SOEs that remained in public ownership started 
restructuring. On the one hand, it turned out that privatization could serve the quicker 
and deeper restructuring, especially if the new owners were foreign investors. On the 
other hand, a large number of SOEs could not be reorganized effectively because they 
lost markets or were run at extremely high costs and became uncompetitive. The 
introduction of bankruptcy regulation in CEE economies effectively removed many of 
the ailing SOEs (Balcerowicz et al. 1998). The second ultimate rationale for privatization 
was the need for restructuring, the introduction of new products, technologies, markets, 
managerial know-how and large scale investments. This is the business rationale for 
privatization. 
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A third rationale for privatization was formulated by the leading political forces of the 
transition process. The new political elite urged de-nationalization in order to break the 
economic background of the exponents of the previous regime. The complete crush of 
the hated communist party might was only possible if the economic basis of SOEs was 
transferred to new owners (Frydman – Rapaczynski, 1994). This argument was based 
on the fact that SOE managers had close ties with communist party leaders as executive 
officers of the command economy. This ambition of eliminating the economic power of 
communist party members was not successful in any of the CEE economies. The second 
line communist party members and corporate managers became new owners of former 
state assets in one or another way. The successor parties of the former communist 
parties also maintained some political influence. 
The balance in the interplay of the three main drivers of privatization changed over 
time in all CEE transition economies. The role of international advisers remained 
important throughout the period until accessing EU membership, but especially during 
the 1990s. During the first decade of transition Hungary took the lead in privatization 
(we do not regard voucher schemes applied in Czechoslovakia an effective privatization 
method). There was a kind of competition among CEE countries in achieving quicker and 
deeper reforms. In order to score better on EBRD privatization scoreboard governments 
reported increases in the share of private business instead of the volume of de-
nationalized property (Poland), or the results of quasi- or surface privatization 
programs that resulted in changes “from public to public ownership” (Mertlik, 1995). 
Nevertheless, there was a strong pressure on governments to reduce the size of public 
ownership. 
Pressure of the business rationale was also rather strong especially in the period of 
the transitional crisis. The Hungarian government lacked the necessary fiscal tools to 
ease this pressure, thus, loss-making SOEs were to be removed from the property 
portfolio of the state either through the sale or through liquidation7 (). However, the 
pressure of competition could be lifted temporarily, and its consequences postponed, as 
it was the case in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The strong devaluation of the 
                                                 
7 Liquidation can also be regarded as a form of privatization since this process also concludes with the sale 
of assets in the case of SOEs (Szanyi, 1995). 
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national currency in these countries provided cost competitiveness for SOEs for 5-6 
years until this cost advantage was inflated away. Unfortunately, most SOEs did not take 
the opportunity of restructuring during the grace period and were confronted with 
similar competitiveness problems in the late 1990s than earlier. Also, SOEs that 
participated in the Czechoslovakian voucher privatization program were exempt of the 
effect of the bankruptcy regulation. Thus, the second main driver for restructuring was 
also made ineffective. 
In fact, the interplay among liberalization (increased competition), effective 
bankruptcy regulation and privatization with the sales method could be also used to 
cure the old behavioral problem of CEE economies: the state paternalism. The 
relationship between state (as owner) and governments was characterized by regular 
interactions taking place in the bargaining process of conflicting interests of company 
executives and central planners (party officials). The bargaining process over available 
resources and the expected output volumes created a fertile soil for rent seeking. 
Company managers tried to hoard resources over their actual needs and keep 
performance below their potentials. The process itself was characterized by cozy 
relationships between company management, state officials and party leaders. This kind 
of state paternalism repeatedly resulted in major bailing out programs of inefficient 
SOEs. This type of paternalistic behavior by the state and its expectation by SOE 
managers should also be eliminated in order to enhance SOEs’ restructuring ambitions. 
The breaking of the paternalistic ties was also important from the aspect of the third 
driver of privatization, the political one. Since company managers could not be easily 
replaced (there was no excessive supply of economists and managers in the short run), 
an effective control could be put on them by privatization. Certainly, some forms of 
privatization resulted in insider deals (on mass scale in the post-soviet era, but to some 
extent also in CEE). Insider privatization cannot be regarded as an effective from the 
business viewpoint because SOE managers’ capabilities did not increase. The emergence 
of many oligarchs was financed by state loans obtained with the help of federal or local 
politicians quite similarly as it was usual in the previous regime. The old type of 
paternalism survived, crony capitalism spread quickly in the Yeltsin era. Altered forms 
of state paternalism survived also in CEE economies. Privatization was also used as a 
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tool of transferring economic power to the new political elite. However, this did not 
mean the end of state paternalism or the elimination of the channels of crony capitalism, 
but rather the establishment of new forms and channels. The new political elite also 
strengthened its economic power and entered the arena of crony capitalism. 
The political condition of privatization was therefore largely fulfilled. Not in the sense 
that former communist leaders were ruled out from business. Rather in the sense that 
economic power of old and new elite became more balanced. Therefore, the threat of 
reversing the political transition was lifted. Old and new elites equally became 
integrated in the new market economic system. Instead of reversing political transition 
it is rather the emergence of a new type of paternalistic relationship between business 
and government, a new form of crony capitalism that may bring new threats to efficient 
economic development of CEE. 
Tendencies of privatization in the CEE region are quite known. Hungary effectively 
finished the process by the end of the 1990s using mainly the sales method and 
preferring FDI in the process. The Czech Republic and Slovakia maintained higher share 
of state property during the 1990s, nevertheless, continuous problems of SOE 
management and slow restructuring forced the governments to sell by the turn of the 
millennium. The Polish privatization process was more sluggish, mainly because of the 
need for widespread social negotiations with stakeholders, and the effective blocking 
the privatization of many large SOEs by their workers and the Solidarity movement. 
Hence, the volume of state property remained relatively high in Poland, and government 
agencies together with SOE managers were forced to pursue effective adjustment 
policies. In some other cases, however, various other government policies provided the 
necessary sales revenues for financing continuous operation8. Polish governments 
repeatedly launched privatization programs to sell the remaining assets until quite 
recently. The latest 2012-3 plan however has not been started. 
The privatization process was declared finished in 2009 by the Hungarian 
government. However, this was rather a political statement. Since then some further 
assets were sold, albeit not at the magnitude of the earlier privatization campaigns. The 
                                                 
8 This was the case in mining, electric power generation and metallurgy through price controls and 
subsidies. 
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new element that will be discussed in more details is the reverse process that has been 
started after 2010. The strategy of the government has been changed. Instead of 
reducing the asset portfolio, the Hungarian government started to buy new assets. 
Actions of this policy will be described in this section. After comparisons with the Polish 
privatization and state asset management practice, I will provide a political economy 
explanation of the policy change in the final section. 
 
2.1. The political economy of the Hungarian privatization experience 
The first years of the privatization process were determined by the process of 
“spontaneous privatization”. According to the 1988 Law on Transformation SOEs had to 
transform their legal form to an incorporated company. This meant among others that 
2200 SOEs’ ownership structure had to be defined. As part of the economic reform 
process, the last communist government intended to improve incentive systems by 
commercializing SOEs and provide an effective ownership pattern for them. 
Simultaneously, private business ventures were also given a larger room to maneuver, 
their size limit (in terms of employment) was lifted. Soon state assets were siphoned 
from SOEs to various private businesses, mostly owned by corporate managers. In fact, 
through this act SOEs were taken from the direct control of the Communist Party and the 
state bureaucracy (this was intended), but no effective new ownership pattern was 
introduced (enterprise councils for example could be easily manipulated by corporate 
managers). This practice of asset stripping was stopped only after the new (non-
communist) government set up the State Property Agency (SPA) in 1991 that was also 
charged with privatization tasks. Asset stripping was stopped effectively by the 
establishment of the agency, since SOEs were obliged to inform SPA and get permission 
for all transactions above a certain value limit. In fact, this regulation also hampered 
SOEs economic activity, since the agency had only very limited personnel capacity. 
Soon after this, intentional privatization was also started. As mentioned before, SPA 
preferred the sales method for the highest bidder, but simultaneously also provided 
avenues for alternative methods9. For example, partial restitution was organized in form 
                                                 
9 Since there was no matching international experience with the various privatization methods, basically 
all CEE transition countries applied various kinds of methods with different emphasis. 
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of restitution coupons, a kind of security that could be used in the purchase of state 
assets. Some large manufacturing firms and banks were introduced on the Budapest 
Stock Exchange, and their shares were sold at discounted rates for interested Hungarian 
citizens. Nevertheless, these transactions had only marginal effect on the Hungarian 
privatization practice. Instead, already in the early 1990s SPA sold a number of lucrative 
large firms to foreign investors (Tungsram, the internationally known lighting industry 
firm to General Electric Co.; Chinoin, one of the most successful pharmaceutical 
companies to Sanofi S.A.). These deals were to herald the main emphasis of the 
Hungarian privatization policy10. 
Around the years 1992 and 1993 SPA realized that it had no sufficient capacity to 
directly control SOEs’ day-to-day activities and simultaneously prepare the conditions 
for the privatization deals. The problem was exacerbated by the 1992 introduction of a 
new bankruptcy regulation that effected serious measures in case of insolvency. Since 
most SOEs could not perform sufficient restructuring efforts, many of them went 
bankrupt11. The interaction of privatization and bankruptcy had also an important effect 
on institution building in Hungary. It produced an environment where the old 
opportunistic behavior of firms (and firm management) with the state was broken. SOEs 
could no longer rely on various measures of accommodation by the state. Government 
declared no interest in maintaining state ownership, privatization was taken serious and 
virtually no exemption was provided from the effect of the harsh bankruptcy regulation. 
This set of measures together with more stringent prudential regulations of the 
commercial banks the main creditors of the loss-making SOEs effectively forced SOEs to 
intensive restructuring. It also provided sufficient credibility to the Hungarian 
government that resulted in less opportunism and more efficiency of the economic 
policy in general (For more details see: Szanyi, 2002). 
But even if the privatization and asset management agency’s personnel only 
monitored but did not design corporate restructuring, it still had no sufficient capacity 
                                                 
10 Parallel with this all kinds of foreign investment was promoted through a number of FDI incentives, like 
tax holidays. 
11 Only in the year 1992 over 2000 bankruptcy or liquidation procedures were started, half of it against 
SOEs. When compared this number with the initial stock of 2200 SOEs one should bear in mind that a 
large number of firms was split into pieces in order to enhance privatization with the sales method. 
This meant, of course, that only viable branches remained active and fit for privatization, redundant, 
ineffective branches were separated and bankrupted. 
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to design the privatization process for all SOEs in the portfolio. Hence, during the mid-
1990s corporate managers were also actively involved in the privatization process of 
their own companies. Managers were expected to prepare privatization plans using 
permitted methods (sales, MEBO, stock exchange), SPA only controlled the process. The 
effect of the “small privatization method” was expanded to several hundred small and 
medium sized firms. At the same time, SPA made important efforts at selling the 
remaining larger manufacturing firms, furthermore banks and later also large service 
providers (electricity companies, for example). By the late 1990s the decade-long 
privatization effort (together with the effective bankruptcy regulation) was almost 
finished. In most segments of the economy (industry, trade, financial sector, most of the 
services) virtually no state ownership remained in place. 
 The bulk of the privatization was carried out in the 1994-1998 reign of a socialist 
government (with strong links to incumbent managers). There was consensus among 
parties and within the society concerning the main directions of political and economic 
transition, including privatization. Opposition criticized some aspects, especially the 
strong involvement of foreign investors. Their statement implicitly targeted the political 
but also maybe the material benefits that could be obtained in the process. This meant 
mostly clientism, preferential treatment of participants from the business background of 
the ruling political parties (throughout the 1990s there were coalition governments in 
Hungary), but it might also mean access to corruption revenues. 
As far as the existence of corruption (fraud) in privatization is concerned there is of 
course little evidence. Only a few big scandals signed that there was some unlawful 
practice present, but this was nothing to be compared with the criminal records of post-
soviet states’ privatization processes. Evolving democratic institutions and foreign 
control helped strengthening the rule of law in Hungary. Nevertheless, if we do not stick 
to unlawful transactions that potentially triggered judicial processes we can also regard 
cases of cronyism and clientism, the lack of level play conditions in the privatization 
process. In this broader sense of unethical practices the Hungarian privatization 
continuously provided negative evidence, starting with the obvious case of spontaneous 
privatization. 
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In the 1990s unethical practices used mainly loopholes in the legal regulations. 
Spontaneous privatization became possible and its asset stripping practice could be 
carried out absolutely lawfully, because the institutions of effective control was lacking. 
Of course, most concrete asset transfer deals were provided some business rationale, 
explanation for the absent state owner. Fraudulent behavior was very difficult to prove. 
The government of the years 1998-2002 launched a few challenges of asset stripping in 
the spontaneous privatization, but the processes were closed without result. The same 
preparations were applied also later on. The next main period of unethical asset transfer 
transactions were bound to the bankruptcy procedures. Here again, fraud was hardly 
ever proved, nevertheless, the years between 1992 and 1995 were regarded as a 
bonanza for bailiffs but also for SOE managers. When the automatic trigger of the 
bankruptcy law was in effect, so many cases were filed that nobody really had a chance 
to question the responsibility of management in the evolution of insolvency. For sure, in 
many cases insolvency was deliberately caused by management in order to reduce the 
market value of the companies and make them less lucrative for potential investors, thus 
creating better conditions for management participation in the privatization process, or 
for buying out valuable assets in the liquidation procedure. 
Unfortunately, the privatization process was burdened by unethical cases that 
produced political explosives for the opposition. Yet, to my knowledge there was no 
privatization process that was free from such cases. Even the once appreciated 
Czechoslovak coupon privatization process resulted in an unhealthy concentration of 
assets and continuous opportunism and rent seeking that also produced a lot of dismay. 
The only exception in this case might be Poland, where the whole privatization process 
was carried out with high level social transparency and consensus (Blaszczyk – 
Woodward, 1999). 
Populist sentiments have characterized the state property management policy of the 
government after 2010. The repeated anti-globalization attacks targeted mainly the 
largest multinational companies in various services industries. Reduction of the 
dependence from the globalized world economy needed for example financial 
institutions in national hands (if public, the better). Obtaining the desired level of state 
assets was made possible through various transactions. In the 2013 case of the 
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cooperative of local deposit collecting financial institutions the method of regulatory 
capture (see: Yakovlev, 2006) was applied. First the state increased the level of required 
deposits. Since the small banks could not meet the new obligation overnight, the state 
itself provided them with the necessary capital and connected this transaction to the 
acquisition of a controlling share of ownership. Owners of the small banks were not 
asked before but were provided an ultimatum for the case they would reject the 
generous offer. In 2014 the Hungarian state acquired MKB Bank from the German 
owners. The German parent bank was unwilling to run the Hungarian daughter at loss 
and sold to the only serious buyer: the Hungarian state. The losses were, however, 
caused by various negative changes in the business environment initiated by the 
Hungarian government (extra tax on banks’ profits, tax on financial transactions), and by 
the process of restituting the Swiss-Franc debtors12. The achievement of 50 % of 
national property presence in the banking sector was heralded soon after. Later that 
year FHB Bank was purchased by the Hungarian Post increasing national ownership to 
over 60 % of bank assets. Éva Voszka (2013) provided a rather comprehensive 
description of takings by the Hungarian state between 2010 and 2013. Until than state 
property held in corporate shares doubled (and this amount further increased in 2014). 
Bulk of the increment in the property was acquired in the nationalization of the private 
pension funds, when securities of the funds were taken over by the asset management 
company of the state. But there were also purchases, like the banks listed above. 
Summing up the lessons of the Hungarian privatization and state asset management 
practice, we can state that the privatization process dominated the 1990s with clear 
preference of asset sales to foreign investors. Also, Hungarian investors could obtain 
assets, but this process was not sufficiently transparent especially in the spontaneous 
phase and in the liquidation procedures. This lack of transparency and the potential 
occurrence of fraud provided explosive fuel for populist argumentation. After the main 
processes of transition were finished and the country became member of the European 
                                                 
12 The essence of this very long partly judicial partly regulatory process was twofold. On the one hand, the 
government wanted to punish multinational banks when it required them to pay back substantial part of 
the charged interests for citizens whose loan contracts’ interest rate was unilaterally increased by the 
bank. On the other hand, the government wanted to support the several hundred thousands of citizens in 
order to collect their votes for the 2014 election campaign. For this purpose the government already 
spent substantial amounts of the state budget also earlier to compensate debtors for losses due to 
disadvantageous exchange rate changes. 
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Union foreign control on state asset management and privatization was lifted. The 
looser foreign control and the weak performance of domestic controlling institutions 
(democratic political and civil alike) as well as the breakup of the parliamentary 
opposition increased the room of maneuvering of the Hungarian government. Based on 
the weak and inefficient control populist arguments were used to gain social acceptance 
and appreciation for a series of measures, including the increase of state controlled 
assets. The aim of the measures was to limit the presence of multinational companies in 
a series of domestic markets, and increase business opportunities of firms of the 
clientele or those in direct state control. Later in this paper I will insert this policy in the 
broader political economy framework of transition and privatization. 
 
2.2. The Polish experience 
Poland’s economic, social and political conditions were different from the Hungarian 
situation. This country also pioneered economic reforms under the communist regime, 
however these did not proved to be more successful than the Hungarian efforts either. 
Nevertheless, a sizeable private sector existed at the very beginning of the economic 
transformation, and entrepreneurship had some background in the country. More 
important was however, the difference in political traditions. After turbulent worker 
demonstrations during the 1970s the 1980 foundation of the Solidarity trade union 
movement meant a bottom-up organization of a massive social institution that had a 
strong voice and could not be controlled by the communist governments. Many believe 
therefore that Solidarity’s political activity was a main component of the overall 
transition process in CEE. When compared with the Hungarian case this meant a strong 
independent political force with widespread social base especially among workers, the 
voice of which could not be neglected. In Hungary, bottom-up movements lacked trade 
unions were crashed as they were regarded remnants of the communist era, new social 
organizations were initiated and controlled by political parties. While in Hungary there 
was no significant independent civil movement, Poland had a strong one that influenced 
and monitored many transition policies. 
Another peculiarity of the initial conditions of the Polish transition was the way of 
debt management by the government. Poland had similarly high foreign debt, but unlike 
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Hungary, who maintained debt repayment, Poland rendered moratorium on debt 
payments, and negotiated with the Paris and London clubs of creditors about partial 
debt write-off and the rescheduling of the remaining parts. The different path of debt 
management in Poland resulted in the temporary loss of interest in investing in the 
country. 
Privatization policy was also influenced by these peculiarities of the Polish transition 
process. On the one hand, privatization policy was built on extensive negotiations with 
the stakeholders, including workers and partners of to be privatized companies. In most 
cases the outcome of the negotiations decided the actual method used in the actual 
privatization transaction. The negotiation process was of course strongly influenced by 
the government agency (Privatization agency, later the Ministry of Treasury), 
nevertheless, consensus was developed, and without the consent of the stakeholders no 
transaction was carried out. In many cases stakeholders, especially worker councils 
effectively blocked privatization transactions. During the 1990s Polish governments 
could not touch a number of large manufacturing and mining factories, where Solidarity 
movement had especially strong traditions. Therefore generally speaking Polish 
privatization was a slow process, but the actual privatization deals were probably better 
prepared, privatized firms had better chances for restructuring and maintaining the 
level of production and employment, than in Hungary13. Nevertheless, there remained 
substantial state property for the 2000s. 
During the 2000s Polish privatization process slowed down, partly because of the 
preparations for the EU-membership, partly, because of anti-privatization sentiment of 
the Kaczynski government. Donald Tusk’s middle-right wing government reinforced the 
continuation of the privatization process, mainly because of the “traditional” business 
considerations. The Polish governments continuously subsidized many loss-making 
SOEs during the 2000s that contributed to a substantial increase of the state debt14. 
Thus, privatization was relaunched in 2007 as it is clearly seen in the statistics. The peak 
in terms of revenues was achieved in the year of 2000 with over 9 bn US$ preceded by 
                                                 
13 On the effects of privatization on corporate restructuring in Poland see: Blaszczyk and Woodward, 
1999. 
14 One should bear in mind that the Polish constitution limits the highest level of state debt, therefore the 
elimination of continuously existing black holes in state budget is also an important political priority. 
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year 1999 with revenues over 4 bn US$. The period of lull produced the highest value in 
2004 with 3,5 bn US$. The privatization plan for the years 2008-11 was largely 
accomplished and realized revenues of 15,5 bn US$ (The Economist, 2011). It is 
therefore even more striking that the execution of the 2012-13 privatization plan was 
effectively banned. The question emerges: why? As we will later see the change in 
privatization policies had similar roots like in Hungary. 
Polish privatization policy was at least as eclectic as the Hungarian, although there 
has also been a dominant privatization avenue in Poland. The 1990 legislation provided 
indirect and direct ways. The indirect way obliged SOEs to commercialize in the first 
step thus becoming a shareholder company, the shares of which belonged to the 
treasury. In the second step Treasury sold the shares in various ways, through initial 
public offering on the stock exchange, sale to strategic investor, or included the shares in 
the portfolio of the National Investment Fund program, the planned Polish mass 
privatization vehicle. NIFs were set up according to a 1993 Act, and the Polish 
government intended to add the shares of 512 SOEs to its portfolio. Due to continuous 
debates over the privatization methods in the parliament and the difficulty of obtaining 
consensus among SOE stakeholders the indirect path did not take momentum after 1993 
either15. Some privatization through sales was carried out, and a number of SOEs were 
privatized on the basis of the communist-era bankruptcy regulations (Blaszczyk et al. 
1999). In the vast majority of the actual privatization cases of the period 
commodification of the shares was implemented only on terms that were accepted by 
insiders. Outsiders could only obtain shares with the permission of insiders and this 
typically did not hurt insider dominance in shareholding (Woodruff, 2004). 
The direct way foresaw simultaneous commercialization and privatization. It 
suggested three methods of de-nationalization after SOEs’ commercialization, sale, 
contribution to a company established by the Treasury and the leasing of assets. 
Privatization leasing became very popular in Poland since it promoted asset purchases 
by insiders whose consent was unavoidable on the application of any of the privatization 
                                                 
15 The parliamentary debates effectively blocked the introduction of worker control and self-governance 
supported by Solidarity movement. Yet, worker control over the privatization process was guaranteed. 
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methods16. Leasing made the purchase of the stock easier for insiders as compared with 
immediate cash payments. This method was a real compromise between liberal policies 
trying to enforce privatization and the Solidarity-backed worker self-governance that 
would not leave the nominal SOE status requiring the possibly the safe haven of 
government interventions (accommodation, bailing-out)17. However, the valuation of 
the SOE assets was regularly so high that it was beyond the financial capabilities of the 
company employees and made the involvement of outside investors necessary. 
Nevertheless, the employee council of the company had the right to invite outside 
owners, who were in most cases outside stakeholders; suppliers or customers of the 
firm (Woodruff, 2004). 
As a result of the sluggish way of Polish privatization during the 1990s, primary 
privatization steps (commercialization) was typically not followed by the actual 
denationalization of corporate shares that remained in state ownership. As Blaszczyk 
and Woodward (1999) emphasized in the introduction of their paper by that time the 
general distrust of privatization just started to be compensated by the facts of its 
benefits. Moreover not only company managers but also the public had to realize the 
need of privatization for successful restructuring in the companies and the Polish 
economy as a whole. This recognition was regularly strengthened by news information 
about pending privatization cases that were finally closed and firms (mostly with foreign 
owners) started to produce profits at the expense of moderate reduction of employment. 
Consequently, the years 1999 and 2000 witnessed skyrocketing privatization activity 
in Poland. This was due to the then favored direct sale method and the denationalization 
of some large banks and service providers. However, this momentum stopped in 2001 
when the previous sluggish insider-oriented methods continued. A new revival of 
privatization sales started with the Tusk-government in power. After necessary 
preparations privatization revenues started to grow in 2009, reached the top in 2010 
with over 6bn US$ and produced half of that level in 2011. The net privatization income 
of the Tusk-government between 2008 and 2012 reached 15,5 bn US$ (The Wall Street 
                                                 
16 Employee share ownership patterns of some Western democracies served as example for the advocates 
of this ownership form for the privatization process (Blaszczyk, 1993.) 
17 Discussions about the use of MEBOs in the privatization process highlighted the danger that capital and 
expertise required for company restructuring was not readily available for the new owners. 
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Journal, 9. 19, 2012). The same source already heralded the change in concept: large 
firms were regarded “strategic” and not to be privatized. This meant that the new, still 
rather ambitious privatization program for the years 2012-13 was not enforced with the 
momentum of the previous years. A strange halt in selling controlling shares of some 
“flagship companies” mainly in the financial sector was observed by The Economist 
(2011) already concerning the otherwise successful privatization campaign of 2008-11. 
Polish government seemed to pull the emergency break of the privatization train. This 
development, maintaining state assets is quite similar with the conceptual changes of 
state property policies in Hungary. The question is why is it more rewarding 
maintaining or even increasing state ownership? Do the rationales of the 1990s not 
apply anymore? Did governments become better owners? What conditions changed18? 
 
3. The political economy of privatization and public property 
management 
The political context of privatization was discussed in many aspects, out of which I 
will pick only two that could help us better understand the turn in the relationship of 
governments towards the status of state property. The first string of literature deals 
with the impacts of political influence on corporate restructuring in public and private 
companies. The other highlights the role of privatization in strengthening private 
property and the rule of law in a broader sense. These two aspects strongly determined 
the privatization process in CEE but also influenced the development of market 
economic institutions, thus contributing to the basic systemic elements of the capitalist 
model in CEE. The turn in state asset policy can also be explained at least partially with 
changes in these aspects. 
 
                                                 
18 Kowalewski and Rybinski (2011) provided an interesting analysis of the developments on the 
ownership patterns in the Polish financial sector. They stated that remaining state ownership 
combined with rather efficient bank supervision through the authorities and the relatively developed 
capital markets jointly contributed to the better risk-bearing capacity of the Polish financial sector 
during the 2007-9 crisis. Strict prudential regulation, transparency in the capital markets (banks are 
obliged to list their shares, and are not simple affiliated companies of multinational banks) as well as 
better coordination with government policies due to substantial state ownership resulted in increased 
financial stability. On the other hand, FDI and capital market control reduced the risk of state capture 
too.  
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3.1.  Concepts of the 1990s 
Privatization was regarded mainly as an element of the neo-liberal transition policy 
mix during the 1990s. In this period the lack of expertise with market economic 
institutions and the important role of international financial organizations in 
conceptualizing and also financing institution development in CEE resulted in the strong 
influence of SLIP. The argumentation was described in rather sophisticated ways in the 
seminal paper by Boycko et al. (1996). This paper collected the empirical survey results 
on the inferior business performance of SOEs and provided a theoretical explanation of 
the phenomenon19 . The starting point of the paper was the “commonplace observation 
that public enterprises are inefficient because they address the objectives of politicians 
rather than maximize efficiency. One key objective of politicians is employment: they 
care about votes of the people whose jobs are in danger and, in many cases, unions have 
significant influence on political parties.” (p. 309) The average voter argument in the 
explanation of various features of business-polity interplay is often used, albeit its 
conditions are hardly controlled (it is out of the scope of modelling). Therefore, although 
the authors readily acknowledge that “excess employment is not the only politically 
demanded inefficiency of state firms…(they state that)… it is surely the most commonly 
noted one” (ibid). Based on the previous analysis in this paper it is likely that excess 
employment was a strong determinant in the Polish transition story, but it was much 
less relevant in Hungary, especially in the privatization process. In Hungary, political 
influence was more directed towards various more direct forms of political rent seeking. 
I will argue later, that this relationship became dominant in Hungary and motivated also 
the Polish policy makers, especially in the past 10 years. 
The argument of the Boycko – Shleifer – Vishny paper continues with the comparison 
of direct state ownership and private ownership in terms of their options of maintaining 
excess employment, and the price of it.  In the case of a SOE excess employment 
deteriorates corporate efficiency and therefore limits profitability. The price of 
maintaining employment level is foregone profits of the firm. From the ownership 
position politicians can easily move SOE managers to give preference to employment 
                                                 
19 The survey of empirical results referred to studies carried out in some developed market economies 
including the USA and many developing countries. No transition economies could be included by that 
time. 
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against profitability. The paper allows the use of bribes for that purpose. We know now 
from CEE experience that there was no need for that: SOE managers remained as they 
were before the transition executors of the political will. They were nominated and 
withdrawn by the same political formation that also directed them. This was a kind of 
survival of state paternalism, and also the soft budget constraints. 
The paper assumes that there is a political power in the CEE transition economies 
that sincerely aims a reform of the business-polity relationships thus allowing (former) 
SOEs better chance for restructuring. Reformers are confronted in the paper with vote-
maximizing individual politicians, and privatization is a good vehicle to make politicians 
excess employment more expensive.  Politicians keep on trying to influence business 
and achieve their political goals. In the case of private (privatized) firms however, this 
proves to be more difficult and expensive. In this case control over management may 
weaken or disappear, new shareholders’ interests must also be respected, who are 
interested mainly in profits. Thus, excessive employment can be financed through state 
subsidies from the Treasury rather than by foregone profits. The main question of the 
paper is why would a politician fail to buy his way to high labor spending through 
subsidies? In this case subsidies are financed by excess taxes or inflation, both of them 
are extremely unpopular. “The public and the reformers may not be aware of the 
potential profits that a state firm is wasting, but they are keenly aware of the alternative 
uses of tax revenues, and would not wish to spend public money to subsidize private 
firms not to restructure. This difference between the political costs of foregone profits of 
state firms and of subsidies to private firms is the channel through which privatization 
works…” (p. 311). 
The paper also makes a statement about the desirable new ownership structure of 
privatized firms. From the perspective of the limitations of the influence of the vote-
maximizing politician new owners’ motivations and goals must be the furthest from this. 
Therefore employee ownership that is the effective access of controls, not just cash 
flows is not recommended. Workers are interested in excess employment and do not 
support restructuring. Due to their access to significant control rights even prior to 
privatization they could effectively bloc or at least delay privatization in some countries 
(e.g. in Poland). On the other hand control by large outside investors who are unlikely to 
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care about employment is superior. Incumbent management’s position was thought to 
be in between. 
This paper’s argument and its conclusions strongly influenced the way how advisers 
and also reformers of CEE thought about privatization, especially concerning the 
elimination of close ties between business and polity20. The paper also highlighted the 
difficulties of privatization especially in the presence of strong unions (Poland). The 
suggested solution of selling to strategic investors was the dominant privatization 
method in Hungary, where the business rationale was ranked first as opposed by 
political considerations during the 1990s. Improving efficiency in the economy, 
strengthening the business rationale of corporate activities was the first important 
concern that privatization could support. Simultaneously, privatization also contributed 
to withering away the paternalistic links to the state and to hardening of the budget 
constraints of firms. 
The other important string of literature on the relationships of ownership patterns 
and establishing property rights (institution building in general) is illustrated by an 
important paper of Andrzej Rapaczynski (Rapaczynski, 1996). In this approach 
privatization’s role is described in the agenda of market economic institution building. 
At the heart of this process we find the problem of establishing the system of property 
rights and strengthening the rule of law. This is in contrast with the inherited CEE 
system that was characterized by uncontrolled paternalistic ties of the state with 
economic units. As it was shown, the actual implementation of the idea of central 
planning also suffered from the existence of cozy links among company leaders, party 
officials and central planners. Thus, we may state that this type of relationship (called 
paternalism in the communist era or crony capitalism in market economies) has similar 
roots. Strengthening of the property right regime and the rule of law through adequate 
ways of privatization could also contribute therefore to the break with the old 
paternalism and not letting transform it to the other type of cozy relations, cronyism. 
This ambition could certainly also contribute to better performance and higher 
efficiency of economic agents. 
                                                 
20 Or maybe the paper reflected and conceptualized the mainstream way of thinking and practices. 
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The main message of Rapaczynski’s paper is that institutions of enforcing property 
rights are partly legal partly social institutions. Legal institutions can work properly only 
if there is a general tendency in the society to obey the law, and only in few outlier cases 
must legal institutions be used. Hence, while it is important to have properly formulated 
and consistent laws and regulations as well as an adequate judicial capacity in the 
country, the rule of law can be established only if soft social institutions are also on 
place. They can develop only in a long social process. Hence, “the experience of post-
communist countries in eastern Europe is a good remainder that economists tend to 
assume a can opener when one is needed. Indeed, the statement that property and 
contract rights must be ‘put in place’ assumes away one of the most interesting and 
intricate questions concerning economic development. The creation of a system of 
enforceable entitlements to the diverse and complex forms of wealth… is itself a process 
subject to economic laws…. it is in fact largely a product of market forces, rather than 
governmental fiat” (Rapaczynski, 1996, p. 87.). 
Moreover, this co-development and co-existence of legal regime and other elements 
of the economic system is relevant “not only in democracies, in which economic power is 
always felt in the political process and has an impact on legislation, but also in 
authoritarian regimes, which need something more than force to maintain themselves. 
Consequently, the legal-regulatory activity of any government does not follow some 
abstract and predetermined rules, …but is basically reactive to the situation in the 
market…..The market determines the strength of the various interest groups that 
formulate their plans for governmental regulation…. and that regulation in turn modifies 
the forces of the market and the relative strength of the interest groups ” (ibid, p. 88.). 
The development of the legal-regulatory system is therefore not an outcome of fully 
rational choice or recepy of economic advisors, but rather an incremental, competitive 
evolutionary process. Most property rights can only be marginally enforced by the legal 
system.  In the process of coevolution of manifested and soft social institutions the “core 
of the institution of ownership is a matter of unquestioned and largely unconscious 
social and economic practices that must be rooted in non-legal developments” (ibid.). 
This system of soft social institutions supports the enforcement of property rights but 
also establishes credibility of various government policies. If people for whatever reason 
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come to believe that the government is able to enforce the law and policies this “very 
belief makes the sovereign in fact capable of making sure that its commands are obeyed” 
(ibid.)  Woodruff (2004) also used this argument and argued that it is usually not the 
fear of sanctions that moves citizens to obey the law, but rather the recognition of the 
rationale and usefulness of the expected behavior. In an earlier paper I also emphasized 
the role of general credibility of CEE governments in their capacities to enforce their 
policies (Szanyi, 2002). But the same driver works also in the authoritarian countries 
(see: Yakovlev, 2006). 
The main problem of property right enforcement in the transition process of CEE was 
the lack of time necessary for the coevolution of markets and legal institutions. These 
economies possessed a large amount of assets in their SOEs to be transferred into 
properly functioning company forms of advanced market economies on very short 
terms. Legal institutions could be created rapidly, but they were not accompanied by 
quick development of the soft social institutions necessary for their efficient 
enforcement. Most CEE economies still suffer from low levels of property right 
enforcement. The success of privatization in terms of higher corporate efficiency and 
restructuring required that state assets were put “in new organizational configuration, 
which already presupposes the complex types of entitlements characteristic of the 
advanced market economies…. Consequently, the background necessary for the transfer 
may be missing or incomplete, and the state…. might fail to convey them effectively to 
other parties” (Rapaczynski, 1996, p. 92.). Rapaczynski suggested therefore that reform 
steps in the transition process must concentrate also on the overall development of 
market institutions not just establishing the legal framework. He stated that “certain 
economic measures undertaken by the government may contribute more to the 
establishment of viable property rights than volumes of new codes and legions of new 
judges and policemen” (ibid)21. 
From the viewpoint of the main concern of this paper, the changing attitude of 
governments towards state assets, Rapaczynski also provided important comments. He 
directed attention to the fact that in CEE the state itself might be the most significant 
                                                 
21 A positive confirmation of this statement can be the reform package of the Hungarian government 
during the mid 1990s. 
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threat to the security of property rights. “The role of the state in securing property rights 
from encroachments by third parties is probably much less significant than its ability to 
precommit credibility to respect these rights itself” (ibid). The first such possibility of 
encroachment is outright confiscations by the state. This happens relatively rare, but the 
constitutional and legislative guarantees against such takings “are usually quite fuzzy at 
the edges” and this fuzziness of the takings law is not accidental. The state routinely 
engages in its economic regulation in cases resulting in encroachments that are not 
considered compensable takings. General protection from a superficial spread of such 
takings can be provided by the political system together with the economic pressure 
groups “that ensure that the state does not go ‘too far’ in interfering with the owner’s 
control over assets. This politically determined thin line may be understood as the real 
definition of property rights conferred by the state… In fact, without a significant 
historical record of state forbearance from excessive and redistributive regulation, it is 
hard to make the state’s commitment credible….The threat posed by the state to the 
security of broadly defined property rights is particularly severe when the state also 
happens to own a significant proportion of national assets.” (ibid, p. 93.). 
In 1996 Rapaczynski’s argument was in favor of efficient privatization policies of the 
time. But his statement on the dangers posed by the state on the security of property 
rights that intensifies with significant state asset ownership has more general meaning. 
Achievements in establishing market institutions may be easily broken if the “politically 
determined thin line” of property rights definition is shifted. Governments may establish 
both positive and negative historic records over time that promote or weaken social 
trust in property right enforcement. As it was emphasized, single economic measures 
and their enforcement may have bigger influence on the evolving soft social institutions 
in CEE than lots of new laws. If privatization is stopped or even reversed, if governments 
carry out unusually excessive takings as it was the case with the private pension funds’ 
property in both Hungary and Poland, such steps demolish much of the weak and just 
evolving social institutions and undermine trust in the rule of law. 
Another aspect of the dangers of excessive state ownership was also identified by the 
author. “A state that conducts much of its policy through the exercise of its ownership 
rights (which leave a lot of discretion to the decision maker) tends to neglect the 
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development  of its regulatory capacities (where a certain degree of transparency and 
procedural regularity is required) and thus increases the degree of arbitrariness in the 
pursuit of its economic policies” (ibid). Academic papers usually assume that there is a 
progressive ambition in the countries and societies that drive development, and the 
scholars’ task is to drive attention to potential dangers on development and suggest 
practices to overcome these. This paper suggests that privatization may be used as a tool 
to escape the dangers of property right enforcement stemming from excessive state 
ownership. But most current events in CEE allow me the observation that the current 
political setting creates incentives for the state to pursue policies that intend to achieve 
exactly those negatively perceived conditions that the papers of Boycko et al. (1996) and 
Rapaczynski (1996) call potential dangers on economic restructuring, corporate 
efficiency, the enforcement of property rights and strengthening the rule of law in 
general. It seems that governments in Poland and in Hungary wish to increase the 
arbitrariness of their economic decisions, to escape transparency and control, to find 
politically less costly ways of reinforcing political ambitions among others in SOEs. This 
is exactly the opposite than what reformers were expected to do. We owe an explanation 
of the reasons and the rationale of this policy. 
 
3.2.  Changing conditions and changing policies 
Boycko et al. (1996) calls excessive employment the most typical political ambition 
that is forced on companies thus deteriorating their efficiency. But other forms of 
political opportunism and rent seeking are also plausible. They mention an article that 
described the perverse crediting policy of the state-owned bank Credit Lyonnais of 
France that favored clients of the ruling party. I believe that this type of rent seeking has 
always been more important than employment issues for vote collection. 
I distinguish three types of actual cash transfers from the economy to politicians and 
their clients. One of them is outright corruption and bribing. In our case bribes go the 
opposite way, not from the politician to the manager to achieve excess employment, but 
from the manager to the politician and the bureaucrats to buy preferential treatment or 
simply a license of operation. The corrupt politician and bureaucrat (the bureaucrat 
usually also depends on the politician, as he is nominated to his position by his “boss”) 
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may expand this activity to the extremes as it was conceptualized by Yakovlev (2006) 
with the notion of business capture, and Viktorov (2013) on corporate raiding. CEE’s 
conditions are of course by far not that bad than in Russia, but corruption also exists in 
CEE. High level scandals that involved government officials and other highly ranked 
party politicians or their clients revealed the fact that countries like Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia or the Czech Republic are not immune from this danger either (EU transfers to 
Bulgaria and Romania were effectively lifted due to high level corruption). 
Corruption especially of highly ranked officials is sentenced by law. But there are 
other not necessarily illegal albeit seriously unethical opportunities of money transfers 
from the business to the polity. State ownership is most relevant in these. Positions at 
the commanding heights of SOEs are regularly filled by clients of politicians22. This 
practice on the one hand eliminates the conflicts between management and politician 
(there is no need to bribe SOE managers to take decisions in favor of the politician). But 
this gives also an opportunity of milking the SOE through various channels. A SOE is 
useful for this purpose regardless of its potential efficiency. The social cost of this 
practice is not just foregone profits any more but continuous cash flow from various 
state institutions (the state budget) that are transferred from the SOE to private uses. 
SOEs may finance various social and cultural events, deliver red carpet treatment to 
politicians, donate charity organizations or various activities of the government and 
politicians. SOEs are also used for the rewarding true clients of the politicians by for 
example financing expert fees to clients. 
 Of course the usage of SOEs for these purposes is not new and is observed not just in 
transition economies of CEE. However, this fact does not spare me the conclusion that 
current policies at maintaining state ownership is aimed at widening the rent seeking 
activity of political parties and governments. It is made possible exactly because of the 
low level of transparency and social control, and the activity causes the same types of 
problems that were described in the cited papers, and is therefore very harmful for the 
future of market institutions in CEE. The reasons of intensive rent seeking in CEE are 
manifold. Apart from personal gear we can state the lack of regulated party financing. 
                                                 
22 Skuhrovec (2014) reported peeks of personnel changes in Czech SOEs’ supervision bodies after national 
election years.  
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Political parties’ budgets are very meager (at least in Hungary), and parties spend far 
more especially on election campaigns than what they are expected regarding their 
revenues. Also, positions in SOEs and various benefits received from them serve as 
remuneration for political services of clients. This is all made possible because of the 
lack of effective social and political (oppositional) control on the activities of SOEs.   
There might be some changes in the practice of milking state property during the 25 
years of transition in CEE. Apart from the active political involvement in SOE 
management the other main source of cash revenues was privatization. It is not just 
corruption that surrounded the process, but even more importantly the support of 
clients to obtain valuable state property at low prices. The process was well documented 
in the case of Russia, and some anecdotal evidence is also known for Slovakia. However, 
this practice was not absent in other Visegrad countries either. There are of course no 
statistics or even estimations on the extent of the asset value that was transferred to 
political insiders. However, there is a widespread belief in Hungary that regards socialist 
governments more successful in this process. Thus, perhaps the reallocation of state 
assets among the clients of the different parties was not even. This may explain why 
losers of the privatization race tried to find alternative sources of cash flow from SOEs 
rather than from insider privatization. State ownership may also provide a more stable 
platform for rent seeking (as long as political opposition does not take over the control). 
Privatized assets are not suitable for the transmission role either. 
Thus, one reason of less privatization and more state ownership may be the changing 
structure of rent seeking activity by the politicians. Of course the decline of available 
state assets also contributed to this: the remaining assets are either notorious loss-
making companies (like mines in Poland) that are not worth for insiders of possessing. 
Another part is large service providers that cannot be easily transferred to rent seeking 
private hands but are very much suitable SOEs for mass scale milking. Another reason 
may be the changing domestic and international environment. International 
organizations are not concerned so much about privatization any more than they used 
to be during the 1990s. Therefore international pressure for privatization declined23. In 
                                                 
23 Kowalewski and Rybinski, (2011) compared the amount of legislative work performed before and after 
accession. They reported a steep decline in reform legislation in Poland after 2004 which might be due 
to declining outside pressure for reforms. Another analysis of Polish legislative work concluded that 
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2004 Visegrad countries became members of the club. Attention was directed to various 
other areas not so much to the conditions of market institutions or the level of state 
property. Of course, the status of the state budget is also influenced by the performance 
of SOEs as well as their state subsidies, but this is already an indirect link which can be 
easily covered. Also, the important business rationale fell in the meantime. On the one 
hand the overall condition of all transition economies improved (of course not because 
improving SOE performance but mainly due to the increased activity of multinational 
companies and de novo private firms especially in Poland), thus the presence of a 
number of loss-making SOEs could be more easily tolerated. Consequently, the third, 
political rationale redistribution of assets or more recently controls of cash flows 
became the strongest factor in the question of keeping or selling state property. 
 
4. Concluding remarks: relevance for the CEE model of capitalism 
What message does this analysis deliver to the concept of CEE model of capitalism? I 
believe that changes in political attitudes have an important role in the model. 
Increasing direct state intervention in the economy changes the rules of the game rather 
quickly in ways that were described in the paper. Weaker social institutions and 
deliberate government policies aimed at increasing discretional decisions and limit 
transparency may limit also the area of the rule of law. Uncertain and increasingly 
arbitrary business conditions will influence not only domestic but also foreign owners in 
their operations in CEE. Foreign firms’ role as an anchor of the economy may diminish as 
they themselves change their operations or leave the region if they are not willing to 
adjust. Contrary to the assumption of the DME model I think that governments can also 
influence multinational firms’ activities. Governments may try to use this to their favor 
sometimes even at the risk of withdrawal of the foreign companies. This policy is easily 
sold to the societies by populist statements of the governments. 
The populist argument frequently refers to the fact that there are good examples of 
successful and efficient SOEs. The idea of incorporating SOEs in the economic system is 
                                                                                                                                                        
much of the stoved regulatory work served various interest groups and can therefore be regarded as 
expression of state capture, The situation did not change after accession, nevertheless, research 
discovered weaker presence of state capture in legislation after 2007 (Alwasiak et al. 2013). 
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therefore not from devil. I do not think however that SOEs’ role in CEE models is 
identical with any of the other European capitalist models.  We should not forget the 
condition for adequate SOE activity, which is effective social and political control. SOEs 
in CEE are rather used for rent seeking of politicians. 
A further lesson for the CEE model is therefore the outstanding importance of social 
and political control institutions. None of the models has dealt extensively with this 
aspect. They implicitly assumed that foreign control can withhold CEE governments 
from flirting with illiberal political and economic solutions. It seems that this control lost 
efficiency after 2004, and there was no effective internal control in the CEE countries. 
The loosening of democratic control tempted ambitious politicians to move the 
economic and political system away from the traditional Western norms towards an 
authoritarian model more typical in the East. In fact, this type of shuttling between East 
and West, democracy and autocracy has always been characteristic for the countries of 
the region. The most harm is caused by the shuttling itself, because it is always bound to 
sizeable institutional changes which are always very costly. But even more damage is 
caused by the unreliable always changing environment that makes long-term business 
planning impossible.  From the viewpoint of doing business the countable environment 
with some secure institutions (security of property rights) even in autocracy may be 
more valued. 
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